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Abstract
Consumption-based poverty in Pakistan fell sharply 
between 1990 and 2010, according to official poverty data. 
Nonetheless the mainstream narrative on poverty reduction 
in the country remains highly contested. Key sources of 
evidence show improvements that are commensurate with 
a decrease in poverty, while others raise doubts over this 
decrease. The policy space in which poverty reduction is 
debated is also highly polarised, as revealed in the positions 
of multiple stakeholders involved in policy, research and 
civil society in Pakistan. An analysis of official poverty 
data shows how the estimates may be biased – both owing 
to technical flaws and to the politics of measurement. 
As a result, it is surprisingly difficult to reach a definitive 
conclusion as to whether poverty reduced between 1990 
and 2010 and if the stated progress is real. We discuss 
the implications of the high levels of contestation over 
official poverty data as well as the need to understand 
better the types of evidence that the government must 
produce to defend its policies to alleviate poverty, and 
for key stakeholders to accept these as credible. We also 
discuss the steps that the country is taking to depoliticise 
the measurement and analysis of poverty – in and of 
themselves signs of progress.
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1.1 Why explore poverty reduction in Pakistan?
Pakistan appears to have reduced poverty remarkably. 
Reported ratios of national and international poverty 
headcounts1 have dropped sharply – the share of people 
living on less than US$1.25 a day (2005 purchasing 
power parity, PPP) is estimated to have fallen from 64.7% 
in 1990 to 12.7% in 2010 (World Bank, 2015a), and, 
based on the official national poverty line, from 25.5% in 
1992 (Cheema, 2005) to 12.4% in 2010 (Government of 
Pakistan, 2014). 
According to official sources, the factors driving recent 
reductions in poverty include increased allocations for 
social safety-net programmes under the Benazir Income 
Support Programme (BISP) and for the Pakistan Poverty 
Alleviation Fund (PPAF); higher support prices for 
agricultural products that raised rural household income 
and consumption for net producers; improved agricultural 
yields from better crop varieties; increased remittances; and 
increased female employment in rural areas (Government 
of Pakistan, 2014).
Yet major doubts are raised over the veracity of the 
official figures and over the degree of poverty reduction 
in the country. A significant number of stakeholders 
in the policy arena (representatives from the policy, 
research, academic and donor communities as well as 
from civil society) disagree with the official view. These 
stakeholders are positioned in various corners of Pakistan’s 
poverty debate, and have considerable influence over the 
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1. introduction
1 The poverty headcount ratio measures the percentage of population living in poverty.
Plucking green chillies. Photo: © Visual News Associates/ World Bank.
‘in all these controversies, we lose sight of what’s really at stake – the poor people of 
Pakistan’ – Former government official
measurement and analysis of poverty as well as over the 
policies to reduce it. The views they hold vary about the 
progress (or lack thereof) in reducing poverty. Some espouse 
the opinion that official statistics are misleading – poverty 
has increased over time – and others the idea that official 
statistics are not misleading – poverty has indeed decreased 
over time, but that the extent of the decline is debatable. 
To many stakeholders, the official national poverty 
line is fraught with complexity that is both technical and 
political in nature. According to them, the purported 
progress is incommensurate with wider macroeconomic 
and political conditions in the country as well as with 
trends in other dimensions of wellbeing. The drivers of 
progress, from their perspective, have also not favoured the 
poor (key informant interviews, 2015). 
The inability to state with confidence as to how many 
people are living in poverty at any point in time or how 
the poverty headcount ratio is changing acts as a major 
handicap for policymaking in the country. The polarised 
poverty debate in Pakistan also raises broader questions. 
It points to deep-seated epistemological questions over 
what constitutes evidence and why this matters. And it also 
presents an opportunity: to establish a credible evidence 
base for future efforts to reduce and possibly eradicate 
extreme poverty in the country. 
It is against this backdrop that we explore in this case 
study whether progress in reducing poverty in Pakistan has 
been real, and why the official data and the mainstream 
narrative on poverty reduction are so contested. We map 
the claims made by official as well as other stakeholders, 
exploring first a wide range of evidence, and then a range of 
perceptions. We also examine, in some detail, the technical 
and political disputes over official poverty measurement. 
Unlike other case studies in Development Progress that 
aim to measure, understand and communicate where and 
how progress in different areas of wellbeing has occurred, 
we focus on the disputes over official poverty estimation in 
Pakistan with a view to underscoring the point that any proof 
of progress presented as ‘official’ needs to be both defensible 
and verifiable, as well as accepted by key stakeholders. 
Moreover, any efforts to depoliticise the official measurement 
and analysis of poverty need to be duly recognised and 
treated, in and of themselves, as signs of progress.  
1.2 country context
Pakistan is a lower middle-income country (World Bank, 
2015b) with a population of 189 million people (UNDESA, 
2015). This makes it the sixth most populous country 
in the world. It is among the top nine countries that are 
expected to account for more than half of the world’s 
projected population increase between now and 2050 
(ibid.). It also has a higher rate of urbanisation (38%) than 
the other two large countries in the region – India (33%) 
and Bangladesh (34%) (UNDESA, 2014). 
According to the World Bank, for the greater part of 
the 1990s poverty fell in Pakistan (see Figure 3, page 11). 
A severe drought in 1998 affected the country, raising the 
number of people in extreme poverty by 13 million – from 
40 million in 1998 to 53 million in 2001. Since then, 
for most of the 2000s, both the absolute number and 
the percentage of people living in extreme poverty have 
declined steadily (World Bank, 2015a). In absolute terms, 
22 million people were poor in Pakistan in 2010 compared 
to 72 million people in 1990 (ibid). This is despite the 
population increasing from 108 million in 1990 to 170 
million in 2010 (UNDESA, 2015).
While this appears to be an impressive gain, the stated 
reduction in poverty needs to be considered in the context 
of highly unstable conditions in the country. Towards the 
end of the 1990s and for the greater part of the 2000s, 
Pakistan was not only affected by major natural disasters 
such as droughts, but also earthquakes and floods, by 
macroeconomic and political crises as well as acts of 
terrorism. Eight million people clustered above and below 
the international poverty line in 2010 ($1.25, 2005 PPP) 
(authors’ calculations2 based on World Bank, 2015f). Any 
shocks whether external or internal were, therefore, likely 
to have pushed millions of people into poverty, and as 
such, the effects of these shocks have not been satisfactorily 
accounted for in the official narrative on poverty reduction. 
1.3 About the case-study report
The study focuses mainly on the monetary measure of 
poverty (based on consumption) that Pakistan uses to 
compute its official national poverty line (see Box 1 overleaf 
for a brief discussion on monetary and non-monetary 
measures of poverty and for the methodology being used 
to estimate this line). Other indicators of poverty and other 
sources of evidence are also discussed to contextualise, to the 
extent possible, the points of contention between the various 
stakeholders. 
The study has been prepared by a team of researchers 
based at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), as 
well as an external consultant who conducted several key 
stakeholder interviews in Pakistan.
The methodology included: a review of the literature 
on poverty and poverty reduction in Pakistan covering 
the period between 1990 and 2010; quantitative data 
analysis of poverty indicators using available data sources; 
a review of qualitative studies; key informant interviews 
to capture the perceptions of former government officials 
and policymakers, researchers, donors, academics and 
civil-society representatives as well as the perceptions of 
current policymakers and technical experts working to 
2 Authors’ calculations are based on the absolute number of people living in the range between $1.20 (slightly below the international poverty line) and 
$1.30 (slightly above the international poverty line) that is set at $1.25 (2005 PPP). 
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revise Pakistan’s official poverty estimates; a review of 
perceptions data from perceptions-based surveys; and 
a review of government documents, poverty reduction 
strategy papers (PRSPs), and budgetary frameworks. The 
questions this study aims to answer are as follows:
 • What evidence supports the stated reduction in poverty? 
 • What evidence raises doubts over the stated 
reduction in poverty?
 • What are the flaws in the ‘official’ evidence base? 
 • What does the range of stakeholder perceptions demonstrate?
 • With high levels of contestation, what are the 
implications and next steps for measuring and analysing 
poverty in Pakistan as well as for devising and 
implementing effective policies to reduce it?
The reader needs to bear in mind at the very outset that 
this study does not attempt to explain what has driven 
poverty reduction, but rather to highlight the evidence and 
the perceptions on whether poverty reduced between 1990 
and 2010. The sheer nature and diversity of the available 
evidence in addition to the starkly opposite views of key 
stakeholders prevents us from supporting either of the 
two positions with confidence. The contrasting sources 
of quantitative evidence in many instances is compelling. 
The relatively limited qualitative evidence draws attention 
to variables that are overlooked in official accounts. The 
range of stakeholder perceptions also demonstrates how 
political the debate is and why there is a need to separate 
beliefs from evidence. 
The case study is structured as follows: Section 2 covers 
the wide range of evidence through which we evaluate 
the stated reduction in poverty between 1990 and 2010. 
Section 3 maps stakeholder perceptions over whether 
poverty reduced during this time. Section 4 outlines key 
policy implications emerging from the discussion, as well 
as the road ahead. 
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Box 1. Measuring poverty
Poverty is measured in monetary and non-
monetary terms. In this study, we focus mainly on 
the official estimation of poverty in Pakistan, which 
is based on consumption.
The Household Integrated Economic Survey 
(HIES) – now a component of the Pakistan Social 
and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) 
– provides data on household consumption of 
several food and non-food items. The Pakistan 
Bureau of Statistics (known previously as the 
Federal Bureau of Statistics) is responsible for 
conducting the survey. 
The Ministry of Planning, Development and 
Reform (also referred to as the Planning Commission) 
then uses the data to calculate the absolute level of 
poverty in the country using a calorie-based poverty 
line. The calorie threshold, 2,350 calories per adult 
equivalent (as not all household members are adults), 
has been set by the Nutrition Cell of the Planning 
Commission, and the poverty line is updated by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Most analysts argue that provided the information 
on consumption obtained from a household survey is 
captured in sufficient detail, consumption is a better 
indicator to measure poverty than income. Income is 
only one enabler of consumption of goods – others 
include access, availability, etc. (World Bank, 2011). 
Consumption may be measured better than income 
in that people may have less incentive to underreport 
it. It may also better reflect a household’s ability to 
meet basic needs (ibid.). 
Other ways to measure poverty are non-monetary 
and can include a diverse range of indicators to 
reflect its multidimensional nature. Consumption 
and income indicators capture only some, but not 
all, aspects of poverty. Health, nutrition and literacy, 
asset ownership, social exclusion and powerlessness 
are also relevant. In this study, we include the 
statistics on multidimensional poverty estimated 
by both the Social Policy Development Centre 
in Pakistan and the Oxford Poverty and Human 
Development Initiative.
Sources: World Bank (2011) and Naseem (2012). 
This section evaluates progress in poverty reduction (or 
lack thereof) by reviewing the quantitative and qualitative 
evidence on poverty available between 1990 and 2010 (both 
years inclusive). By analysing the evidence, we find that:
 • the estimates produced by the government and the 
World Bank, as well as the results from a panel survey 
on rural households, demonstrate a reduction in 
consumption-based poverty;
 • even though multidimensional poverty estimates do 
not include consumption, they too demonstrate a 
reduction in poverty;
 • levels of poverty are higher in rural than in urban areas;
 • poverty levels fluctuated between the years 2001 and 
2010, according to the panel data on rural poverty, even 
though poverty declined overall in this 10-year period;
 • there are considerable technical flaws in the quality of 
the official evidence base;
 • the estimates on real GDP growth per capita, stunting 
and wasting of children and food security raise 
reasonable doubts over the stated progress;
 • unlike qualitative accounts, consumption-based poverty 
measures do not capture fully poor people’s experiences and 
understanding of what causes poverty, what characterises it 
in rural areas, and what prolongs and perpetuates it;
 • landlessness, natural disasters, health problems and 
deaths in the family, unemployment and social exclusion 
are identified as the most common characteristics and 
causes of poverty, and are largely overlooked in official 
policy responses to poverty.
2. evaluating progress
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Uzma stitches a bed covering in Tausna, Pakistan. Photo: © Asian Development Bank.
‘one doubts the poverty figures when they don’t correspond with everyday
observations’ – Head of an international humanitarian agency
2.1 evidence that poverty has reduced
official evidence
In the Pakistan Economic Survey 2014: 
‘Poverty is defined as a state or condition in which 
a person or community lacks the financial resources 
and essentials to enjoy a minimum standard of life 
and wellbeing that is considered acceptable in society. 
Poverty is pronounced deprivation in wellbeing and 
comprises many dimensions. It includes low incomes 
and the inability to acquire the basic goods and services 
necessary for survival with dignity’ (Government of 
Pakistan, 2014:231).
Based on the official national poverty line3 of Pakistan 
rupees (PKR) 673.5 (per adult equivalent per month in 
1998 prices) poverty has fallen from 25.5% in 19924 
(Cheema, 2005) to 12.4% in 2010 (Government of 
Pakistan, 2014), with significant variations in between 
(see Figure 1). Gauging from the 2010 estimate, Pakistan 
has achieved one of its localised targets under Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) 1: to halve, between 1990 
and 2015, the proportion of people below the national 
poverty line. It is not on track, however, to meet its other 
two targets under the same goal – to halve, between 1990 
and 2015, the prevalence of underweight children under 
the age of five, and the proportion of the population 
below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption 
(Government of Pakistan, 2013a and 2014). 
Aligned with the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers5 (PRSPs), PRSP-I (2003-2007) and PRSP-II (2008-
2011), the government’s expenditure on 17 pro-poor 
sectors, subsumed into five broad categories (market 
access and community services, human development, rural 
development, safety nets and governance),6 increased in 
real terms from US$3.6 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2001/2 to 
US$18.4 billion in FY 2010/11 (Government of Pakistan, 
2013). This expenditure framework adheres to the Fiscal 
Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act (FRDLA) 2005, 
which stipulates that public spending on social and 
poverty-related sectors as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) should not be less than 4.5% (Government 
of Pakistan, 2015).
The government claims that a major boost to safety-net 
spending since 2007 and to BISP in particular (see Box 
2) has facilitated the reduction in poverty in recent years 
(Government of Pakistan, 2014).
evidence from the World Bank
The World Bank7 finds that poverty in Pakistan has fallen 
faster than its South Asian counterparts, but that the 
decline has not been consistent (see Figure 2). 
According to the World Bank, for most of the 1990s 
poverty fell in Pakistan (see Figure 3). As mentioned 
previously, a severe drought in 1998 affected the country, 
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3 Pakistan’s Planning Commission decided to establish an ‘official’ poverty line in 2001. Before then, there was no uniform ‘official’ methodology to 
estimate poverty. 
4 Oddly, many government and donor documents cite a figure of 26.1% as the national poverty headcount ratio for the year 1990, however this figure is 
not based on the official methodology to estimate poverty and is, therefore, not comparable to figures from 1992 and 2010 that are based on the official 
methodology. 
5 PRSPs are country-owned strategies to reduce poverty, written in-country but influenced by the World Bank’s and the International Monetary Fund’s 
development financing arrangements to extend loans and credits to developing countries since the early 2000s. 
6 These cover: market access and community services – roads, highways and buildings; water supply and sanitation; human development – education; 
health; population planning; rural development – agriculture; land reclamation; rural development; rural electrification (People’s Works Programme-
II); safety nets – subsidies; social security and welfare including the Benazir Income Support Programme; food support programme including that of 
Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal and the Punjab Food Support Scheme; Peoples’ Works Programme-I; natural calamities; low-cost housing; and governance – justice 
administration; and law and order.
7 In order to estimate poverty in Pakistan on an internationally comparable scale, the World Bank uses the data that comes from the consumption module 
of the country’s household income and expenditure survey, known as HIES. This is a part of the larger Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement 
Survey known as PSLM. 
Figure 1. Percentage of the population living below the official 
national poverty line
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raising the number of people in extreme poverty by 13 
million – from 40 million in 1998 to 53 million in 2001. 
Since then, for most of the 2000s, both the absolute 
number and the percentage of people living in extreme 
poverty have declined steadily (World Bank, 2015a). In 
absolute terms, 22 million people were poor in Pakistan 
in 2010 compared to 72 million people in 1990, despite 
the population increasing from 108 million to 170 million 
during this time (UNDESA, 2015). 
The World Bank also points to relatively strong 
growth in consumption across the income distribution in 
Pakistan, tilting slightly in favour of the bottom 40% circa 
2006–11. This suggests that Pakistan has experienced more 
‘inclusive’ growth (defined as the ratio of the consumption 
growth rate of the bottom 40% of the income distribution 
relative to the mean) than the average large country 
in South Asia. This is illustrated through a regional 
comparison between Pakistan, India and Bangladesh 
(Figure 4, overleaf). India experienced higher mean 
consumption growth, but consumption of the bottom 40% 
only grew at a rate similar to Pakistan. While Bangladesh 
experienced mean consumption growth similar to Pakistan, 
the growth in consumption of its bottom 40% was much 
lower. 
The World Bank data also shows that Pakistan has one 
of the most equal distributions of national income of any 
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Box 2. the Benazir income support Programme
In 2008 the Pakistan People’s Party-led government 
introduced the Benazir Income Support Programme 
(BISP), which provided cash transfers of PKR 
1,000 per month to eligible families. The two main 
objectives were to cushion the negative effects of 
the food and fuel price crises on the poorest 20% of 
the population, and to develop a modern safety net 
programme that would protect the population against 
chronic and transient poverty (O’Leary et al., 2011).
It was enacted in law in 2010 under the BISP Act. 
The government now in power, led by Pakistan’s 
Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) has increased 
the value of the transfer to PKR 1,200 and aims 
to increase it further to PKR 1,500 per month for 
eligible families. 
In its initial phase from FY 2008/9 to FY 
2010/11, parliamentarians identified beneficiaries. 
In FY 2010/11, the government adopted a new 
approach. It undertook a nationwide Poverty 
Scorecard Survey (using a proxy means test) to 
determine the welfare status of households on a 
scale of 0 to 100. Those households living on or 
below a cut-off score of 16.17 were now eligible for 
income support. As of October 2010, 7.7 million 
families were identified as living below the cut-off 
score of 16.17 (Government of Pakistan, 2015). 
The number of beneficiaries since the 
programme’s inception has increased from 1.7 
million families to nearly 5 million between 
FY 2008/9 and FY 2014/15. BISP’s annual 
disbursements have also risen from PKR 16 billion 
(247 million in 2013 US$) to PKR 90 billion (884 
million in 2013 US$) in the same time period 
(Government of Pakistan, 2015).
Sources: O’Leary et al. (2011) and Government of Pakistan (2015).
Figure 2. Percentage of the total population living in extreme 
poverty (us$1.25, 2005 PPP) in Pakistan and south Asia 
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Figure 3. Absolute number and the percentage of people living 
in extreme poverty (us$1.25, 2005 PPP) in Pakistan
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developing country in the world between 2010 and 2012, 
as measured by the Palma ratio.8 This is an improvement 
compared to the early 1990s, when Pakistan was less equal 
than either Bangladesh or India (Figure 5). 
evidence on multidimensional poverty 
Multidimensional poverty statistics reveal a different 
picture in Pakistan, in part because the indicators to 
compute these are not based on consumption, but on 
other indicators of wellbeing. Multidimensional poverty 
has been calculated within Pakistan by the Social Policy 
Development Centre (SPDC) (Jamal, 2012) as well 
as internationally by the Oxford Poverty & Human 
Development Initiative (OPHI). 
SPDC has used data from various years of the Pakistan 
Social and Living Standards Measurement survey (PSLM) 
to compute a country-level index9 that includes three 
broad dimensions of poverty: education poverty (referred 
to as human poverty), poor housing, and economic and 
household-assets poverty. Based on these, SPDC shows 
that the proportion of people living in multidimensional 
poverty has fallen marginally from 49.4% in 2005 to 
48.1% in 2011 (see Figure 6).
OPHI has estimated the Multidimensional Poverty Index10 
(MPI) for Pakistan using data from the Demographic and 
Health Surveys (DHS) of 2007 and 2013. Its results suggest 
that the percentage of people in multidimensional poverty at 
the national level has fallen from 49.4% to 45.2% between 
the two survey rounds (see Figure 7).
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8 The Palma ratio is defined as the ratio of the richest 10%’s share of gross national income divided by the poorest 40%’s share.
9 The variables to measure human poverty include: illiterate head of household, illiterate spouse, no child of primary age between five and nine in school, 
and no household member with five years of schooling. The variables to measure poor housing include: households with only one room, persons per 
room greater than two, inadequate roof structure, inadequate wall structure, no electricity, unsafe water, no telephone connection, inadequate fuel for 
cooking, and no proper sanitation. Economic and household-assets poverty is measured using these variables: unemployed head of household, and 
households without ownership of home or physical assets. For computation of the index, see Jamal (2012).
10 The education component of the MPI has two indicators: years of schooling and school attendance. The health component also has two variables: child 
mortality and nutrition. The standard of living component has six indicators: electricity, sanitation, water, floor, cooking fuel and assets. Each dimension 
is equally weighted and each indicator within a dimension is also equally weighted. A person is identified as multidimensionally poor (or ‘MPI poor’) if he 
or she is deprived in at least one-third of the weighted indicators. In other words, the cut-off for poverty (k) is 33.33%. 
Figure 4. consumption growth of the bottom 40% in 
comparison to the mean in Bangladesh, india and Pakistan, 
circa 2006–11
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Figure 5. Palma ratio (top 10% over bottom 40%) for 
Bangladesh, india, and Pakistan in comparison to the world 
average in the early 1990s and around 2010
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Figure 6. Multidimensional poverty in Pakistan –   
sPdc method
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evidence from a rural panel survey
In Pakistan, little panel data exists to track movements 
into and out of poverty. The International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) in collaboration with various 
local organisations conducted one panel survey between 
1986 and 1991. In 2012, it collected baseline data for a 
new rural panel survey that will be useful in understanding 
the dynamics of poverty in the future. 
The Pakistan Rural Household Survey, renamed recently 
as the Pakistan Panel Household Survey has tracked 
movements into and out of poverty in rural areas. Three 
survey rounds have been completed to date, and the results 
show a decline in rural poverty from 27.5% in 2001 to 
22.4% in 2010 (Arif and Farooq, 2012). 
By analysing two waves of data from 2001 and 2010, 
Arif and Farooq (2012) show that more rural households 
moved out of poverty (15.9%) than into poverty (13.3%). 
Using three waves of data from 2001, 2004 and 2010 for 
rural areas in two key provinces – Punjab and Sindh – the 
authors also show that, although average rural poverty 
declined between 2001 and 2010 in these areas, the 
decline in poverty between 2001 and 2004 was followed 
by an increase from 2004 to 2010. In their view, these 
fluctuations indicate that the benefits from economic 
growth in the first half of the decade (in terms of poverty 
reduction) were largely eroded in the second half (ibid.).
On the face of it, the evidence to indicate that poverty 
has reduced is quite compelling. As illustrated, the 
estimates produced by the government and the World 
Bank as well as the results from the panel survey on rural 
households demonstrate a reduction in consumption-based 
poverty. Even though multidimensional poverty estimates 
do not include consumption, they too demonstrate a 
reduction in poverty. Yet, all of this evidence is partial at 
best. This is primarily because there are flaws in the official 
evidence base, and because other sources of evidence – 
both quantitative as well as qualitative – raise doubts over 
the stated reduction in poverty.
2.2 evidence that raises doubts 
In this section, we present evidence that raises doubts 
over the stated reduction in poverty. First, we present the 
technical flaws in the official evidence base to counter the 
apparent progress. Second, we present other quantitative 
evidence on real GDP growth per capita, stunting and 
wasting of children, and food security to suggest that the 
progress in reducing poverty may not be real. And third, 
we gain insights from qualitative literature into people’s 
experiences of poverty as well as into the variables 
overlooked in the official narrative on poverty reduction to 
reinforce the doubts. 
technical flaws in the official evidence base 
In this sub-section, we examine the quality of the official 
evidence base beginning first with technical flaws in the 
household surveys (mainly in the consumption module and 
the sampling frame) as well as technical flaws in the official 
measurement of poverty, in particular the adjustment of 
the official national poverty line using the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). 
Technical flaws in household survey data
Issues with the consumption module 
Prior to 1998, the Household Integrated Expenditure 
Survey (HIES) – which provides data on household 
consumption – was conducted on its own. In 1998, it was 
merged with the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 
(PIHS) to consolidate the collection of all socio-economic 
data. This combined survey had a consumption module,11 
and one that tried to retain the earlier HIES format. The 
module, however, underwent two specific changes. First, 
expenditures in the combined survey’s module were recorded 
in less detail. Second, the reference period of consumption 
was changed. Whereas previous HIES data documented 
monthly consumption, the combined survey’s module relied 
on fortnightly consumption for a majority of food items. 
Both the World Bank (2002) and Arif (2006) note that these 
changes are likely to affect the comparability of consumption 
data since 1998 with earlier HIES data.
To illustrate the impact these changes are likely to 
have we examined other country experiences. In India, 
for instance, the National Sample Survey Organisation 
experimented with recall periods of 30 days and 7 days, 
and found that the latter led to estimates of consumption 
11 The acronym for this revised consumption module is still HIES. 
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Figure 7. Multidimensional poverty in Pakistan – oPHi method
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Source: OPHI (2015). 
that were 23% higher (Deaton and Kozel, 2004). A study 
by Beegle et al. (2010) in Tanzania found that reducing 
the recall period from 14 to 7 days increased the poverty 
headcount by 8 percentage points, while using this recall 
period as well as a highly collapsed list of items led to 
estimates of poverty that were 20 percentage points higher. 
In El Salvador, differences in questionnaire design alone 
(using a highly collapsed versus a long list of consumption 
items) led to poverty estimates that were 46% higher 
(D’Souza and Jolliffe, 2012).
Outdated sampling frames
Pakistan has not conducted a national census since 1998. 
The sampling frame12 of the household survey is, therefore, 
old and produces biased poverty headcount ratios. The 
World Bank (2015e) notes that:
‘an obsolete population census in a country that is 
growing or demographically changing will produce an 
outdated sampling frame. Any sample from an outdated 
frame can only make inferences to the population as it 
was comprised at the time of the census and will therefore 
likely fail to represent important groups or areas of the 
population. For example, if there are large population 
realignments by area, say through rural-to-urban 
migration, and if poverty prevalence differs significantly 
by area, an outdated frame will provide incorrect 
population expansion factors (or weights) and will 
produce biased poverty counts’ (World Bank, 2015e:227).
Pakistan’s population has grown significantly faster 
than the projections made from the 1998 Population 
Census. For example, in the 2010/11 HIES13 round, the 
population size was estimated to be 130 million, whereas 
Pakistan’s most recent economic survey (2013/14) issued 
by the Ministry of Finance as ‘a state of the economy’ 
report cited a figure of 177 million for the same year of the 
survey round. If the latter estimate is correct, as many as 
47 million people are missing from the poverty statistics 
(Malik et al., 2014a). 
Technical flaws in official poverty estimation
A major flaw in estimating official poverty figures is linked to 
the adjustment of the official national poverty line with the CPI. 
Adjustment to the official national poverty line 
The consumption basket of food and non-food items was 
fixed in 1998 when the official national poverty line was 
constructed in Pakistan. Over time, the poverty line has 
been adjusted through the CPI to reflect the same cost to 
the average consumer of acquiring that basket. Relying on 
the CPI to make these adjustments is problematic. Food 
weights in the CPI are derived from the Family Budget 
Survey (FBSb)14 from 2007 that is now outdated, covers 
only cities and urban markets, and also underestimates 
household spending on food (Malik et al., 2014b; Business 
Recorder, 2015). For example, the FBSb estimated a food 
share of 35% in 2007, while survey data on household 
consumption for that same year estimated the food share 
to be 37% in urban areas and 51% in rural areas. Higher 
expenditure on food in rural areas, combined with low 
weighting given to the food share in the CPI in high 
food-price periods, are likely to estimate rural poverty in 
Pakistan, with implications for the official national poverty 
estimates (Malik et al., 2014b; Business Recorder, 2015). 
In addition to technical flaws in the official evidence 
base, the statistics on real GDP growth per capita, stunting 
and wasting of children, and food security call the official 
poverty data into question and suggest that the progress in 
reducing poverty may not be real. 
other contrasting evidence
Evidence on real GDP growth per capita
The decline in real GDP growth per capita raises doubts 
over the apparent fall in poverty (see Figure 8). Average 
real GDP growth per capita has declined from 1.9% in 
the early 1990s to 0.9% in the late 2000s. The country’s 
economic history has been turbulent, with repeated cycles 
of growth followed by stagnation (World Bank, 2010).
Evidence on malnutrition and hunger
Malnutrition and hunger are intimately linked to poverty, 
although their relationship with consumption poverty 
in Pakistan is unclear. Given that two of three localised 
targets on halving extreme poverty under MDG 1 are 
related to malnutrition and hunger (target 1.2 and 
1.3: to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the prevalence 
of underweight children under the age of five and the 
proportion of the population below the minimum level of 
dietary energy consumption), we review the national level 
data on stunting and wasting of children under the age of 
five, and also on food insecurity. 
Stunting and wasting: Between two rounds of the 
National Nutrition Survey (NNS) conducted in 2001 and 
2011, the percentage of children under the age of five 
who experienced stunting and wasting increased from 
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12 Household survey data on consumption from HIES serves as the evidence base for producing official poverty estimates. This data is collected through 
a sampling frame that aims to be representative of the country and its diversity. A national census at least every 10 years is needed to construct an 
appropriate sampling frame. 
13 The PBS retained the acronym HIES even though this is the consumption module that underwent changes in 1998, and has since been used to collect 
household consumption data.
14 The CPI only covers 40 cities and 76 urban markets. Malik et al. (2014b) note that the survey methodology, survey instruments, and primary data for the 
Family Budget Survey have never been released and as such it is impossible to assess its quality and reliability with any rigorous scientific methods.
41.6% to 43.7% and from 14.3% to 15.1% respectively15 
(Government of Pakistan, 2011). The National Nutrition 
Survey 2011 finds that:
‘very little has changed over the last decade in terms 
of core maternal and childhood nutrition indicators. 
The survey does point towards gains in iodine 
status nationally following the implementation of a 
universal salt iodisation and promotion strategy, but 
is counterbalanced by substantial deterioration in 
vitamin A status and little to no gains in other areas 
of micronutrient deficiencies. These are reflective of 
an insufficient response to the nutrition situation in 
Pakistan and the lack of coordination in developing 
and implementing a coherent nutrition strategy’ 
(Government of Pakistan, 2011:63). 
Food insecurity: According to the NNS 2011,16 58% of 
households in Pakistan are food insecure. Of these, 28% 
are food insecure without hunger, 20% are food insecure 
with moderate hunger and 10% are food insecure with 
severe hunger.17 Around 52% of urban households and 
61% of rural households are food insecure (Government of  
Pakistan, 2011).
The evidence presented above, i.e., the technical flaws 
in the official evidence base as well as the quantitative 
evidence on declining rates of real GDP growth per capita, 
increased stunting and wasting of children, and high 
food insecurity raises doubts over the stated reduction in 
poverty. The qualitative evidence also reinforces this. 
Qualitative evidence
Even though qualitative evidence is limited in Pakistan, 
it is useful in showing why a nuanced picture of poverty 
and of poverty reduction is needed. Albeit on a small scale, 
the qualitative evidence illustrates that poverty may not 
have reduced. Participatory poverty assessments (PPAs) 
generally produce conflicting accounts, with the PPAs 
portraying a different picture of the poverty situation in 
comparison to national income and expenditure surveys. 
15 This is assessed by looking at anthropometric indicators, clinical indicators and core biochemical indicators.
16 In the NNS 2011, household food security has been determined on the basis of four categories: food secure, food insecure without hunger, food insecure 
with moderate hunger and food insecure with severe hunger.
17 The NNS document does not explain how it arrives at these conclusions (i.e. what constitutes without, moderate or severe hunger). It does mention that 
the survey included questions about: anxiety that the household food budget or food supply may be insufficient to meet basic needs; the experience of 
running out of food, or of having no money to obtain more; perceptions of the respondent that the food eaten by household members was inadequate 
in quality or quantity; adjustments to normal food use, substituting fewer and cheaper foods than usual; instances of reduced food intake by adults in 
the household, or consequences of reduced intake such as the physical sensation of hunger or loss of weight; and instances of reduced food intake or 
consequences of reduced intake for children in the household. 
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Figure 8. real gdP growth per capita, Pakistan and south Asia (1961–2011)
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Factors such as deterioration in asset holdings, food 
insecurity and access to basic services are not captured in 
income or in consumption-based poverty.
Qualitative evidence adds valuable insight. It gives 
‘precision in meaning’, and tends to be contrasted with 
the value of quantitative ‘accuracy in measurement’ 
(Chambers, 2007:9). ‘Participatory statistics can 
be persuasive and more credible than those from 
questionnaire investigations. But they may be discounted 
when they challenge official statistics and threaten 
professional reputations’ (ibid.: 25). 
This evidence is, therefore, an important part of the 
poverty equation in Pakistan. In this sub-section we examine 
three types of qualitative evidence – PPAs, individual and 
group-based interviews, and people’s perceptions about 
the economic situation of their households as well as 
their communities. On their own, some of these types of 
evidence are context-specific, yet seen collectively, they 
are able to cast further doubts on the stated reduction in 
poverty. Mainly, they show that consumption is one of 
many measures of poverty, shocks regardless of their nature 
and scale have devastating and long-term effects, and some 
groups in society continue to experience more poverty than 
others by virtue of their low caste. 
Participatory poverty assessments
Between Hope and Despair18 was a nationally 
representative participatory poverty assessment that 
was conducted between 2001 and 2002. Using a data-
generating process based on participatory wealth ranking 
(PWR), whereby households within the respective 
communities defined their own criteria for wealth and 
wellbeing, the assessment revealed very diverse definitions 
and descriptions of poverty. 
The national report characterised the poor as ‘having 
large families, few resources, little or no security, little 
or no access to health care, only one meal a day, being 
unemployed and in constant debt’ (Government of 
Pakistan, 2002:51). On the other hand, the very poor were 
commonly landless, illiterate, devoid of possessions, and 
unable to afford clothes that were not tattered. They were 
also chronically ill and barely able to afford even one meal 
in a day. The report stated that:
‘The definitions of poverty used by poor people blended 
effortlessly into a description of their assets. In Sindh, 
for example, a poor man was said to be one who had 
one acre of land and one cow. In other places the poor 
were described as those who lived in jhupris (straw 
huts) and whose household items were old and broken. 
This lack of assets was also reflected in rural areas 
of NWFP19 where lack of access to and control over 
natural resources, especially land, forests and water, was 
the main factor determining poverty. In urban areas, for 
example Quetta in Balochistan or Sialkot in Punjab, 
where employment was the major source of livelihood, 
the lack of a job or insecure employment were major 
factors in determining poverty’ (Government of 
Pakistan, 2002:51).  
The national report found that the number of people who 
had fallen into poverty exceeded the number who had moved 
out of poverty, but did not indicate the scale of movement in 
either direction and over what time period. It stated that: 
‘Despite the predominance of poverty across the PPA 
sites, analysts reported that movements in and out of 
poverty did occur. These movements were often long-
term (e.g. over a lifetime) but sometimes sudden events. 
Livelihood strategies were often undermined by the 
types of trends and shocks… and rendered unsuitable 
as mechanisms to cope with seasonal stress periods and 
life-cycle obligations (e.g. dowries, weddings, Eid,20 
funerals). For many households, even those considered 
better-off, one shock – an illness, natural disaster or 
theft, for instance – could initiate a spiral of asset 
liquidation and debt from which it was often difficult, if 
not impossible, to escape. Persistent drought conditions 
were especially responsible for increasing vulnerability 
across Pakistan. The cases where individuals and 
households had fallen into poverty far outnumbered the 
cases of people moving out of poverty, especially in the 
long-term… In many cases, individuals and households 
only temporarily achieved higher levels of wellbeing 
before falling back into poverty. In some cases, 
however, the move out of poverty was more permanent’ 
(Government of Pakistan, 2002:100).
Individual and group-based interviews
In a qualitative study, Lohano (2009) aimed to corroborate 
information from a re-survey in 2004/5 of 226 panel 
households in rural Sindh (the second most populous 
province in Pakistan) that were surveyed initially by the 
IFPRI between 1986 and 1991. Through individual and 
group interviews, Lohano (2009) found that the whole 
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18 For this assessment, a PWR was carried out by Pakistan’s Planning Department in all four provinces from 2001 to 2002 and published for each of the 
four provinces; it was also synthesised in a national report. It involved participatory discussions and activities in two economically contrasting sub-sites 
(poor versus better off) in each of 54 urban and rural research sites that were selected through purposive sampling. The number of sites was fixed in 
advance, considering population and province size. Fifteen study sites were allocated in Punjab, 12 in Sindh, 9 each in North West Frontier Province 
(NWFP) and in Balochistan, and 3 each in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and in the Northern Areas. 
19 NWFP is now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK).
20 Eid is a religious event marking the end of Ramadan, when Muslims fast from dawn till sunset for an entire month, rich and poor alike.
village community was severely affected in the wake 
of the 1998 drought for five years, from 1999 to 2004. 
This damaged villagers’ income from crops and other 
sources plunging them into adverse coping, with negative 
consequences for their asset holdings and investments in 
human capital. The author also found a sharp increase in 
the incidence of poverty over this time, as the percentage of 
households that entered poverty was nearly three times as 
high as the percentage of households that escaped it. 
Kabeer et al. (2010), in a study on marginalised 
populations in Sindh and Punjab, reported on the causes 
of poverty to be landlessness, natural disasters and social 
exclusion.21 Respondents from the marginalised Daha caste 
in Punjab reported that the floods had wiped out their 
crops, destroyed their homes and caused disease in their 
livestock. They moved to nearby uplands and ‘sat there 
like jackals’ waiting for the season to be over (Kabeer et al, 
2010:8). 
Household perceptions
We also examined people’s perceptions about the economic 
situation of their households and their communities. 
Around 79,600 households in the PSLM survey stated 
that the economic situation of their households and their 
communities had improved between the survey year and 
the year before, for the survey years of 2006 and 2012. 
However, respondents clearly reported the economic 
situation as having worsened at the household and at the 
community level between the survey year and the year 
before, for the survey years of 2008 and 2011 (see Figures 
9 and 10). Since 2007 Pakistan’s economic, and socio-
political conditions have been fragile, and it is unsurprising 
to see these reflected in household perceptions. 
The evidence that raises doubts over the stated progress 
in poverty reduction is quite compelling, but also partial 
at best. How then do we reconcile the contrasting evidence 
to state with some confidence that Pakistan’s progress in 
reducing poverty has been real? 
Unfortunately we cannot. This is because in addition 
to the contrasting evidence either in support of or to raise 
doubts over the stated reduction in poverty, the estimation 
of the official national poverty line and of subsequent 
poverty statistics has always been highly political. 
Contestation by key stakeholders over the construction and 
validation of the official national poverty line has pushed 
many technical aspects of the debate into political territory. 
Before we map the range of stakeholders’ perceptions 
and delve into the different areas of their disagreement 
over whether poverty has reduced in section 3, we look at 
the politics of the official national poverty line (see Box 
3 overleaf). The aim here is to understand, to the extent 
possible, the political roots of the contestation. 
21 Kabeer et al. (2010) documented the views and perceptions of those in poverty in two rural and two urban locations in South Punjab and Sindh. At each 
of the sites – selected through prior experience of each research team – local NGOs or key informants assisted in identifying socially excluded groups for 
focus group discussions (FGDs). 
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Figure 9. Household perception of economic situation of the 
household in comparison to the year before the survey
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Figure 10. Household perception of economic situation of the 
community in comparison to the year before the survey
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Box 3. Politics of the official national poverty line
When the Planning Commission established the first official national poverty line in 2001, it hoped to bring some 
uniformity to poverty measurement across the country. The Centre for Research on Poverty Reduction and Income 
Distribution (CRPRID) was assigned to deliver official poverty estimates. It was set up as an ‘autonomous’ entity 
within the Planning Commission, and funded mainly by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
(key informant interview, 2015). 
CRPRID’s ability to deliver credible official estimates of poverty was brought into question throughout the 
2000s. The decline in poverty during the military regime of General Musharraf was surprising to many and 
needed to be validated by external sources. Professor Kakwani, then heading the UNDP’s International Poverty 
Centre, was brought in to validate CRPRID’s estimates for the years 2001/2, 2004/5 and 2005/6. He verified all 
figures (Naseem, 2012). The World Bank was also called in to validate the official estimates. In May 2008, it also 
endorsed the figures. 
Despite these exercises, skepticism grew over the CRPRID’s figures and over the official methodology to 
estimate poverty (Naseem, 2012). This was mainly because of the broader political environment in which estimates 
were being produced and presented (key informant interviews, 2015).
Official sources now cite the poverty headcount rate of 12.4% for the year 2010/11 (the latest year for which 
poverty estimates are available) as an ‘interim’ indication of poverty in the country (even though the World Bank 
has validated this) and highlight that a technical group is currently tasked with reviewing official methodology and 
finding out possible causes of variance in the figures (Government of Pakistan, 2014).
Current policymakers face a dilemma over whether to support the ‘interim’ official poverty estimates. By virtue 
of their political position, they should support the official estimates and the majority of current policymakers do 
subscribe to these. Yet, if they do so, they also risk many trade-offs in the international and domestic policy arenas. 
In the international policy arena, a reduction in poverty numbers portrays a positive image of the country as 
an effective user of international development assistance. It helps to raise the country’s profile of progress towards 
achieving the MDG on halving extreme poverty. On the other hand, a high incidence of poverty lends legitimacy 
to continued donor support. The probability of attracting sizeable international development assistance from 
various donor agencies, particularly in the context of the forthcoming Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
acts as an incentive for current policymakers to demonstrate that the extent of poverty in the country is seriously 
disconcerting, and may be higher than 12.4%.
In the domestic policy arena, ‘there is a lot of anxiety in higher echelons of the government over the delivery 
of official figures’ (key informant interview, 2015). For example, the low poverty statistics at the end of the 
Musharraf regime (17.2% in 2007/8) reduced the confidence of both the previous Pakistan People’s Party-led 
government and the incumbent government that they could reduce poverty further. For any government to endorse 
poverty statistics that it is unable to lower carries clear political risks.
In order to overcome the controversy over official poverty statistics, the Planning Commission convened 
a Technical Group on Poverty in September 2012, consisting of several experienced economists and poverty 
experts. The mandate of this Group was broad and included assessing the arrangements for updating the 
process of estimating poverty; for validating the existing process if found to be appropriate or for presenting 
alternative estimates; for verifying a sub-sample of the household survey data; assessing definitions of poverty 
including multidimensional poverty; building the capacity of the relevant units of the Planning Commission; and 
commissioning research to monitor and evaluate the impact of certain government policies and programmes on 
poverty reduction. 
The Group has met regularly since 2012 and debated several aspects of poverty estimation in order to 
understand and to resolve the outstanding points of contention. The initial meetings were focused on generating 
consensus on framing the problems and prioritising which points to address first. The Group evaluated the process 
of survey data collection by the PBS. It also evaluated the official methodology to estimate poverty and identified 
a range of potential problems with inflation adjustment using the CPI. As a result of such developments, the PBS 
is currently planning to increase the coverage of the CPI to include rural markets. The Group is also aiming to 
narrow down its research agenda and to bring in more rigour and credibility to official poverty estimation and 
analysis. Many of the Group’s recommendations are likely to be presented in 2016.
Sources: Naseem (2012), Government of Pakistan (2014) and key informant interviews (2015).
Key stakeholders mainly comprising policymakers and 
bureaucrats (current and former), donors, researchers 
(independent, and from local and foreign think-tanks), 
academics, representatives from local and international 
humanitarian agencies and from the media have been 
interviewed for this study. The views they hold about the 
progress (or lack thereof) in reducing poverty vary widely. 
Some believe that official statistics are misleading and poverty 
has increased over time, while others believe that official 
statistics are not misleading and poverty has indeed decreased 
over time, but that the extent of the decline is debatable.
In this section, we look at these stakeholders’ perceptions 
in some depth. We map the range of views on whether 
poverty has reduced in order to demonstrate, to the extent 
possible, why the official narrative is so contested. 
3.1 stakeholder perceptions that poverty has 
decreased
The stakeholders who claim that official statistics are 
not misleading and that poverty has decreased over time 
assert the following.
 • Although there may be pockets of extreme poverty in 
some parts of the country (for instance in Balochistan, 
upper Sindh and Southern Punjab), overall the incidence 
of extreme poverty in Pakistan is low. 
 • Rural transformation over the past three decades 
has driven poverty reduction. Rural areas have been 
transformed by improved infrastructure and higher 
connectivity, which in turn has boosted people’s access 
to information, opportunities and markets. Rural lives 
have also improved through higher support prices for 
3. stakeholder perceptions
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Shahzaman Nazar Ali, 15 years old, is a teacher at a school run by volunteers at the Pakistan Navy Relief Camp. Photo: © Asian Development Bank.
‘the timing of poverty estimates is key. the politics of measurement that besets 
technical exercises is really the politics of acceptance’ – Former government official
wheat.22 The employment dynamics too have changed. 
Women’s growing involvement in the agricultural sector 
has freed men to take up employment elsewhere. This 
has raised household income and consumption. 
 • The poor rely on a dynamic informal sector. Owing to 
the growth of this sector, incomes and living standards 
of the informally employed have gone up.
 • The inflow of remittances into rural areas and small 
towns has also improved living standards of the migrants’ 
families. In addition to supporting their families, the 
migrants’ remittances have benefitted the local economy.
 • Pakistan’s shift from universal subsidies for basic 
goods – some selected food items and energy – towards 
targeted subsidies, such as cash transfers to poor 
families through BISP, has also driven poverty reduction. 
 • The extension of financial services to rural inhabitants, 
the poor and women – in particular through microfinance 
– has facilitated income-generating activities. 
 • The effective demand for household appliances (mainly 
refrigerators), and automobiles including motorcycles, as 
reported by consumer goods’ companies, has expanded.
The evidence that connects either of these arguments to 
the stated reduction in poverty is extremely limited. If at 
all available, very few studies on Pakistan attempt to show 
whether and how the transformation of rural areas, the 
dynamics of the informal sector, the inflow of remittances, the 
shift to targeted subsidies, the extension of financial services, 
or the increased effective demand for consumer goods, has 
led to a reduction in poverty. It is, therefore, difficult to 
consider these to be the drivers of poverty reduction. 
The fact that such positive developments can coexist 
simultaneously with high rates of poverty has also 
compounded this difficulty. For instance, people can be 
adversely incorporated into markets and their participation 
need not necessarily reduce their poverty. Increased female 
employment in the agricultural sector can drive up male 
unemployment and underemployment while increasing 
the drudgery of women. An increase in male off-farm 
employment need not lead to a rise in the consumption 
and wellbeing of other household members. Higher 
inflows of remittances can localise inflation. The level of 
income transfers and targeted subsidies may be set too 
low to allow households to invest in human capital and 
other assets, to protect them from an immediate return 
to poverty or to create the possibility of ongoing upward 
mobility. The emergence of a growing middle class and 
increased effective demand for household appliances can 
accompany stubborn levels of chronic and extreme poverty. 
While some of these stakeholders’ arguments may well be 
plausible, the lack of robust evidence in defence of their views 
prevents us from accepting that poverty has indeed reduced. 
3.2 stakeholder perceptions that poverty has 
increased
Contrary to the previous position, the stakeholders who 
claim that official statistics are misleading and that poverty 
has increased over time assert the following.
 • Improvements in official poverty statistics, as reported 
by household survey data on consumption, are not 
commensurate with other indicators of wellbeing, in 
particular the indicators on nutrition, immunisation, 
school enrolment and housing.
 • The global food crisis of 2006, which was followed by 
the Great Recession of 2008, has had an unprecedented 
impact on food prices in Pakistan. Prices for staples such 
as rice, pulses and milk have more than doubled, and led 
people to substitute nutritious food with inferior quality 
food. The rising number of stunted and wasted children 
testifies to this. High food insecurity is also a major 
indicator of increasing poverty.
 • Pakistan’s consistently low rates of economic growth 
during the 1990s and after 2007 have not generated the 
employment needed to keep the level of poverty static, 
let alone to reduce it. The low rates of economic growth 
have prevented the labour market from absorbing 
new workers. Inadequate job creation in parallel with 
unemployment and underemployment has driven down 
household income and consumption, which in turn has 
increased the number of people living in poverty. 
 • In addition to the low rates of economic growth, 
its composition has not been pro-poor. A structural 
transformation of the country occurred with the rise 
of the services sector and a decline of the agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors. Pakistan’s shift towards 
services in the early 2000s was not inclusive, favoured 
only a privileged minority of services-based industries, 
and was unsustainable given low levels of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in an increasingly unstable 
macroeconomic environment. Orienting the economy 
around the short-term needs of Western consumers and 
exploiting cheap labour in the country in order to do so 
did not create lasting benefits. 
 • Economic growth in Pakistan has only benefited people 
in certain parts of the country. Alongside a growing 
difference between the rich and the poor, there are stark 
regional inequalities.
 • Energy deficits since 2007 have adversely affected 
labour productivity as well as small firms’ 
competitiveness. As these firms employ a sizeable 
share of the labour pool, their low-profit potential and 
high costs of energy translate into low wages and job 
insecurity for the workers. 
 • Subsidies on food, electricity and fuel, which previously 
reduced the cost of the consumption basket of poor 
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22 This view is contested, however, on the grounds that almost 50% of rural households are non-farming and half of the farming households are engaged in 
subsistence farming. Increased prices of wheat are, therefore, likely to benefit a small proportion of large-scale farmers.
households are no longer available to them. Moreover, 
income transfers through BISP are ineffectively targeted, 
affecting those households that are eligible for support, 
but are unable to access the funds. Short-term social-
protection strategies such as BISP are unable to lift 
people permanently out of poverty.
 • Several aspects of public finance have failed to address 
poverty. The country’s taxation system is highly 
regressive. The state continues to rely on indirect 
taxation without broadening the tax base. The burden 
of indirect taxation falls mainly on the poor, and 
perpetuates a vicious cycle of poverty. The lack of public 
provision of services such as education and health, 
and the concomitant expansion of the private sector in 
delivering these services, raises out-of-pocket expenses 
for the poor. 
 • The wider political context also raises doubts over the 
stated reduction in poverty. The period under study 
can be divided into three distinct phases: the 1990s, 
a decade of recovery from 11 years of military rule 
characterised by unstable political arrangements; 1999–
2008, a decade of military rule by General Musharraf, 
characterised by significant restructuring of political 
institutions; and 2008 onwards, marked by a new but 
fragile wave of democracy. 
 • The governments of the 1990s were unable 
to achieve high economic growth or to reduce 
poverty. Even though General Musharraf’s tenure 
was marked by economic growth, poverty did not 
reduce significantly. In the period following 2008, 
the democratic government was largely focused 
on preserving its own political position than on 
improving the economic situation. In the words of 
one key stakeholder:
‘When the coalition government led by the 
Pakistan People’s Party took office in 2008, it 
had no Minister for Finance, Economic Affairs, 
or Health for the first six months. There was 
an absence of leadership on economic policy at 
a time when the global economy was adjusting 
to high oil prices and the spill-over effects of 
the global financial crisis were being felt by 
the country. There was a high turnover in the 
State Bank of Pakistan (the country’s central 
bank), with four Governors in a five-year period 
(2008–2013); ideally each of them should have 
completed a tenure of six years. There was also a 
high turnover in the Secretaries of Finance, with 
seven in the lifetime of one government,’ (key 
informant interview, 2015). 
 • Since Nawaz Sharif (the incumbent) gained 
power, the economy has been back on the policy 
agenda. Yet the ongoing security situation, weak 
institutional capacity and clientelist policymaking 
continue to affect the ability of the government 
to devise and implement strategies for economic 
growth, employment generation and poverty 
reduction.
 • Broader geopolitics following the political decision to 
support the war on terror that was made during the 
Musharraf regime has perpetuated conflicts, displaced 
scores of people, worsened the state of law and order, 
and driven down investment and employment. A 
substantial proportion of state resources are dedicated 
to managing conflict. A lack of investor confidence is 
inducing capital flight, with Pakistanis investing abroad 
or in non-productive sectors, such as real estate. The 
economic toll of the war on terror has been immense. 
Over 13 years, the war on terror has cost the country 
US$102.5 billion (Express Tribune, 2014) with its 
impact being profoundly anti-poor. 
The evidence that connects these arguments explicitly 
to an increase in poverty is extremely limited. Where 
relevant, we incorporated some of the evidence in section 
2.2 on ‘evidence that raises doubts’ over the stated 
reduction in poverty. For instance, we examined the 
technical flaws in the survey data and in official poverty 
estimation, as well as the evidence on real GDP growth per 
capita, malnutrition and hunger. We found these to raise 
reasonable doubts, yet still be partial at best. 
The fact that such negative developments need not 
necessarily increase poverty has also raised the level of 
ambiguity. Without rigorous studies in Pakistan, for 
instance, on the impact of the energy deficits, of the switch 
from universal to targeted subsides, indirect taxation, the 
wider political context or of broader geopolitics on poverty, 
it is hard to state confidently that poverty has increased. 
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In this study we have explored key features of the poverty 
debate in Pakistan. Section 2 examined the evidence in 
support of the officially stated reduction in poverty and the 
evidence that raises doubts over it. We found the evidence 
on both sides of the argument to be partial at best, and 
conclude that we are unable to affirm or reject whether 
poverty has reduced on the basis of the evidence alone. 
In Section 3, we sought to understand why the data 
and the mainstream poverty narrative are so contested 
by mapping the range of perceptions of key stakeholders 
who have an influence over the poverty debate, and the 
subsequent measurement and analysis of poverty. We found 
that, while some stakeholders may have valid concerns 
about the official data and the official view, not all of their 
arguments are plausible especially given the ad hoc and 
anecdotal nature of their evidence base that is insufficiently 
robust at the country level. 
Treated in isolation, neither the evidence in Section 2, nor 
stakeholder perceptions in Section 3, serve to answer the 
question of whether the stated progress in reducing poverty 
in Pakistan has been real. However, the cumulative effect 
of our findings casts reasonable doubts over the official 
poverty figures and demonstrates that the evidence of, and 
perceptions over, progress are surprisingly inconclusive. 
This section discusses the policy implications of 
such high levels of contestation, and closes with 
recommendations for the road ahead.
4.1 implications
The disputed evidence is unable to confirm Pakistan’s 
progress in reducing poverty between 1990 and 2010 and 
thereby in achieving its first localised target under MDG 1. 
As the timeframe of the MDGs draws to a close, Pakistan 
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road ahead
A salesman in the Walled City of Lahore, Pakistan. Photo: © Aga Khan Cultural Service – Pakistan.
stands unable to assess its progress in reducing by half 
the proportion of people living below the official national 
poverty line. The baseline figure of 26.1% (for 1990) cited 
in policy documents as well as in various progress reports to 
donors is not based on the official methodology to estimate 
poverty and cannot be used to benchmark progress. The 
12.4% official figure for poverty in 2010 is also considered 
‘interim’. In other words, an incorrect baseline figure and 
the tentative nature of the latest official figure leaves us with 
a surprisingly inconclusive story of progress. 
The perpetual state of ambiguity over the progress 
in reducing poverty is detrimental to policymaking. The 
inability to establish clearly poverty trends between 1990 and 
2010 impedes the government’s ability to make policy and to 
allocate resources based on past evidence. It cannot evaluate 
what has or has not worked in previous decades to reduce 
poverty. The ongoing controversy over the claims of poverty 
reduction also weakens the credibility of public policy. 
The contestation over official poverty figures 
overshadows the broader policy agenda. The policy debate 
(in particular since the mid-2000s) has been confined to 
agreeing on a single figure – the percentage of people living 
in poverty in the country. This has overshadowed other 
equally important poverty-related issues in the policy 
agenda. These include, for instance, understanding the 
dynamics of poverty, its determinants and distribution 
below national and subnational levels, and the changing 
characteristics of poor households as a result of shifting 
demographics and market structures. 
Pakistan demonstrates how hard it is to present official 
poverty estimates when the data and the mainstream 
narrative on poverty reduction are so contested. It 
reinforces the view that data is inherently political as 
well as technical, therefore, any proposed solutions 
should aim to involve both politically orientated and 
technical recommendations. It also illustrates that 
without the necessary buy-in from key stakeholders, 
especially from those outside government, the official 
figures will lack credibility both now and in the future. 
An improved and comprehensive evidence base is likely 
to make policymaking easier and to turn the debate into 
a source of positive reflection. It is also likely to open up 
new avenues: to create positive feedback loops in policy 
formulation, implementation and evaluation and lead the 
way out of a vicious spiral of controversy, contradiction 
and contestation. In short, official evidence that is not 
only defensible and verifiable, but also widely accepted 
by key stakeholders in the policy landscape is likely to 
steer the road ahead. 
4.2 the road ahead
New sampling frames must represent the population. The 
government’s plan to conduct a nationwide population 
census in 2016 (last undertaken in 1998) is a crucial step 
forward. The new sampling frames that will be generated 
from this census must reflect the demographics and 
household characteristics of the country adequately. These 
will in turn strengthen the household surveys that form the 
basis for estimating official poverty figures.
The weights of the CPI must reflect what households 
in both rural and urban areas spend on food and non-
food items. Coverage of the Family Budget Survey that 
determines weights in the CPI needs to expand to rural 
areas, as most poverty in Pakistan is rural. The weights in 
the index must reflect accurately the amounts that different 
households spend on food and non-food items. As these 
weights are used to inflate the official poverty line it is 
vitally important that they be representative. 
Stakeholder consensus needs to be built and the 
differences in accounts of poverty reduction reconciled. 
Stakeholders in highly influential positions must be 
encouraged to build consensus. The Technical Group 
on Poverty that is advising the Ministry of Planning, 
Development and Reform must confirm that its 
recommendations are amenable to application, i.e. in 
producing estimates that are consistent and unbiased and 
that help in comparing changes in poverty over time as 
well in devising and implementing effective policies. 
Pakistan must establish a credible baseline upon which 
to assess progress in reducing poverty between now and 
2030. A credible baseline will enable Pakistan to monitor 
and plan its progress in reducing as well as eliminating 
poverty in all its forms everywhere in line with SDG1. This 
will also complement Pakistan’s Vision 2025 strategy.23
23 Vision 2025 is the incumbent government’s vision document for the next ten years as well as the policy roadmap for the Ministry of Planning, 
Development and Reform.
‘We are mindful that we have never been short of policies and plans but the failures 
in the past have been in the area of implementation’ – Minister for Planning, 
development and reform, Ahsan iqbal in Vision 2025
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